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Since the emergence of a solid anti-positivist approach in the philosophy of science, an 
important question has been to understand how and why epistemic frameworks change in 
time, are modified or even substituted. In contemporary philosophy of science three main 
approaches to framework-change were detected in the humanist tradition:
1. In both the pre-theoretical and theoretical domains changes occur according to a rather 
constrained, predictable or even pre-determined pattern (e.g. Holton).
2. Changes occur in a way that is more random or unpredictable and free from constraints 
(e.g. Kuhn, Feyerabend, Rorty, Lyotard). 
3. Between these approaches, a middle position can be found, attempting some kind of 
synthesis (e.g. Popper, Lakatos). 
Because this situation calls for clarification and systematisation, this article in fact tried to 
achieve more clarity on how changes in pre-scientific frameworks occur, as well as provided 
transcendental criticism of the above positions. This article suggested that the above-mentioned 
positions are not fully satisfactory, as change and constancy are not sufficiently integrated. An 
alternative model was suggested in which changes in epistemic frameworks occur according 
to a pattern, neither completely random nor rigidly constrained, which results in change 
being dynamic but not arbitrary. This alternative model is integral, rather than dialectical and 
therefore does not correspond to position three.
© 2012. The Authors.
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In a previous study (Loubser in press [a]) I have explored the characteristics and functions of 
epistemic frameworks that are recognised, to a fair extent, by contemporary philosophers of 
science in both the humanist and reformational tradition. The conclusion of the investigation 
was that several pre-scientific frameworks are widely recognised as influencing scientific inquiry. 
Concomitant with the recognition of the role of pre-suppositions in science, it has also become 
evident that epistemic frameworks seem to have some kind of plasticity or capacity for change 
and this raises a basic question: how does change in epistemic frameworks take place? This is 
the problem statement of my current article, which forms (together with the previous study 
mentioned above) part of a research project, consisting of four articles in total, on patterns of 
change in epistemic frameworks.
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Verandering in epistemiese raamwerke: Willekeurig of beperk? Sedert die eerste verskyning 
van ’n soliede anti-positivistiese benadering in wetenskapsfilosofie, is ’n belangrike vraag hoe 
en waarom epistemiese raamwerke oor tyd verander, gewysig of selfs gesubstitueer word. In 
kontemporêre wetenskapsfilosofie kan drie hoof benaderings tot raamwerk-verandering in 
die humanistiese tradisie bespeur word:
1. In beide pre-teoretiese en teoretiese domeine vind verandering plaas volgens ’n taamlike 
beperkte, voorspelbare of selfs voorafbepaalde patroon (bv. Holton).
2. Verandering vind plaas op ’n wyse wat meer willekeurig of onvoorspelbaar en sonder 
beperkings is (bv. Kuhn, Feyerabend, Rorty, Lyotard).
3. Tussen hierdie benaderings kan ‘n middel posisie aangetref word, wat ’n tipe sintese 
probeer handhaaf (bv. Popper, Lakatos). 
Hierdie situasie noodsaak verduideliking en sistematisering en die artikel het dan gepoog om 
meer duidelikheid te bied oor hoe verandering in pre-wetenskaplike raamwerke plaasvind. 
Verder is transendentale kritiek van die bogenoemde benaderings in die artikel aangebied. 
Die artikel het voorgestel dat die bogenoemde benaderings nie volledig bevredigend is 
nie, aangesien verandering en konstantheid nie tot ’n voldoende mate geïntegreer is nie. ’n 
Alternatiewe model is voorgestel waarin verandering in epistemiese raamwerke plaasvind 
volgens ’n patroon wat nie heeltemal willekeurig of beperk is nie, sodat verandering dinamies 
is, maar nie arbitrêr nie. Laasgenoemde posisie is integraal, eerder as dialekties en stem dus 
nie met posisie drie ooreen nie.
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Unlike the previous article, here both pre-scientific and 
scientific frameworks are considered (the latter being 
discussed most). In contemporary philosophy of science the 
demarcation between pre-scientific and scientific thinking 
has been complex and problematic (cf. Coletto 2011) and falls 
outside of the scope of this article. However, I should at least 
clarify that in this article terms like ‘pre-scientific’ (or ‘pre-
theoretical’) refer to frameworks such as religious ground 
motives and worldviews, whilst terms like ‘scientific’ (or 
‘theoretical’) refer for example to philosophy, a theorem, a 
special science and other related frameworks. In some cases 
frameworks contain both scientific and pre-scientific elements, 
for example Kuhn’s idea of the paradigm and subsequently 
also the disciplinary matrix (cf. Loubser in press [a]).
The term ‘change’ refers to variations in the presuppositions, 
content and convictions embedded in epistemic frameworks. 
These variations can be either intrinsic (causing more 
profound change) or peripheral (causing only superficial 
change). I do not imply, however, that an epistemic 
framework (e.g. a worldview) can be transformed into a 
different type of framework (for instance a religious ground 
motive). The issue of change should be regarded as related 
but not identical to the theme of progress. In fact, the main 
question of this article is not whether or not, or how scientific 
progress occurs but how change (progressive or not) occurs.
In some cases, in contemporary philosophy of science it has 
been argued that changes in epistemic frameworks occur 
according to a constrained pattern (in both the theoretical 
and pre-theoretical domains). For example, in the case of 
the theoretical domain, Holton (1973:13–18) has argued that 
changes are not random, but follow at least some predictable 
lines.
In other cases, however, arguments are provided in support 
of the opposite view, namely that changes in epistemic 
frameworks are to a large extent random or free and 
unpredictable. Kuhn (1970a:176; cf. 1970b:260–263), for example, 
might be interpreted as viewing changes in paradigms 
as a result of persuasion due to propaganda (Lakatos 
1970:177–180; 140 fn. 3), whilst Feyerabend (1975:40; 43–46 
& 1985:xiii) proclaims that ‘anything goes’ in terms of 
method and that changes occur randomly also at worldview 
level. Contributions from Rorty (1990:3–15) and Lyotard 
(1984:83–86) also seem to support the idea that changes are 
quite unpredictable. Between the above mentioned opposite 
views, a middle position, attempting a kind of synthesis, 
is found. Arguments by Popper (1963:132; 222 & 1970:57) 
and Lakatos (1970:91–195) seem to be in support of such a 
middle position. These rather polarised approaches call for 
clarification and systematisation: do changes in epistemic 
frameworks occur in a random or patterned manner?
The hypothesis underlying this article is that change and 
constancy are related to epistemic frameworks according 
to a pattern referring to the irreducibility of coherents1, 
where change and constancy exist in cohesion. Constancy is 
the necessary substrate for change in such a way that change 
cannot occur or be detected without reference to constancy. 
In this hypothesis, I agree with Strauss (2009:13 cf. 163–
167) that change can only occur ‘on the basis of something 
persistent or constant’. This means that change does occur 
but is never completely random or absolute. Instead, it is 
deeply integrated with constancy. Although at this stage 
this hypothesis can only be introduced, a full discussion 
and justification are provided in a further article (Loubser in 
press [b]).
The issue of change and constancy is one of perennial interest 
in philosophy and will continue to have relevance as long as 
philosophy is alive. This article only focuses on a limited time 
period and on a limited field of study (philosophy of science). 
Nevertheless, the historical survey presented here is rather 
extended, stretching from the 1920s to the 1990s. The reason 
is that it is necessary to trace the development of the specific 
themes in a sufficiently broad range of examples in order 
to illustrate the three main positions mentioned above. At 
the same time, to avoid excessive extension of the historical 
part, the more recent decades are not taken into account. (In 
the process, however, the most prominent contemporary 
philosophers of science are considered).
The leading theoretical arguments in support of my analysis 
will take the following form. I will give a description of three 
viewpoints held in the humanist tradition in philosophy of 
science:
1. changes in frameworks occur in a way that is rather 
structured, constrained or pre-determined 
2. changes in frameworks occur in a rather free and random 
manner
3. framework changes occur in a manner which is partially 
constrained and partially random.
In all these ‘models’, I will argue that change and constancy 
are not sufficiently integrated. In turn these positions, I 
suggest, are related to the two poles (nature and freedom) of 
the humanist ground motive. After formulating a hypothesis 
on the pre-theoretical foundations of these three positions, I 
will propose an alternative that follows the work of Stafleu 
(1987:153–157) in the reformational tradition. I will argue 
in favor of a position of patterned framework changes, in 
which change is neither completely random nor rigidly pre-
determined, but always integrated with constancy.
The purpose of this article is to clarify how epistemic 
frameworks change and this is intended to provide the 
basis for further studies into the factors that influence these 
changes. Furthermore, it may facilitate dialogue between two 
1.The ‘coherents’ refer to an ontology of modal aspects (or modes of being) of temporal 
reality. Dooyeweerd (1979:40–41) distinguishes between fifteen modalities (the 
numerical, spatial, kinematic, physical, biotic, psychical, logical, historical, lingual, 
social, economic, aesthetic, judicial, ethical and certitudinal) which are irreducible 
to each other, but none the less display an analogical coherence. The mutual 
relationships between the aspects can be seen in the form of anticipations (where 
one aspect refers to another aspect later in the modal order) and retrocipations 
(where an aspect refers to another aspect earlier in the modal order). As an example 
of retrocipation, consider the concept ‘economical pressure’: here the economical 
aspect refers backwards to the physical aspect.
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traditions (humanist and reformational) that proceed from 
rather different starting points. Let us begin by considering 
the way in which scientific development was conceived by 
supporters of the Received View of science. 
Patterned or constrained change
Cumulative changes in the Received View
According to Suppe (1974:3), during the 1920s philosophers 
of science construed scientific theories as ‘axiomatic calculi’ 
which were given ‘partial observational interpretation by 
means of correspondence rules’. This analysis (referred to 
as the Received View) was a product of logical positivism 
and was to be understood according to the basic tenets of the 
latter movement (Suppe 1974:6).
Suppe states that the Received View goes hand in hand 
with a view of scientific development, known as the thesis of 
development by reduction in that the former is presupposed by 
the latter (Suppe 1974:56). According to this view, scientific 
theories (when highly confirmed) are accepted as relatively 
free from the threat of future disconfirmation (Suppe 1974). 
This means that development in science is supposed to take 
the following form:
1. confirmed theories are extended to have a greater scope
2. new highly confirmed theories are developed for related 
domains
3. confirmed theories are incorporated into comprehensive 
theories (pp. 55–56).
This causes scientific progress to be regarded as a ‘cumulative 
enterprise, extending and augmenting old successes with 
new successes’ and furthermore, ‘old theories are not rejected 
or abandoned once they have been accepted; they are just 
superseded by more comprehensive theories to which 
they are reduced’ (Suppe 1974:56). This can be regarded as 
an example of constrained or patterned change. Against 
this background we can now consider the views of Gerald 
Holton, who believes that framework changes follow at least 
recurrent and persistent ‘themes’. 
Holton and persistent themata
Holton (1978:8) finds that scientific concepts, methods, 
propositions or hypotheses contain elements that function 
as ‘themata’ in constraining, motivating, guiding or even 
polarising scientific research and scientists (as individuals 
or communities). These themata (often not explicitly stated 
in scientific work) can have three different uses: as thematic 
concept (e.g. the application of the concept of ‘symmetry’ 
or of ‘continuum’), as methodological thema (e.g. the 
preference for expressing the laws of science in ‘constancies’, 
‘extrema’ or ‘impotency’) and as thematic proposition or 
thematic hypothesis (e.g. overarching statements like the two 
principles of special relativity) (Holton 1978:9).
Some of Holton’s more interesting findings seem to be that 
themata occur in ‘antithetical couples’ (e.g. evolution and 
devolution, constancy and simplicity, reductionism and 
holism, hierarchy and unity etc.) and that this seems to 
be related to the ‘dialectical nature of science as a public, 
consensus-seeking activity’ (Holton 1978:10). Moreover, 
according to Holton (1978:10) the amount of themata (as 
singlets, doublets or triplets) is very small, with new additions 
being very rare. This means that themata are ancient and 
persistent (Holton 1978:10) and that old themata fare very 
well in newly elaborated contexts.
The existence of themata appears to give scientific frameworks 
some constant identity through growth and changes, even in 
the most radical advances (Holton 1978:10–11). In contrast to 
Holton, however, some authors in the philosophy of science 
seem to occupy a middle position between constrained 
changes and more random framework changes. In the next 
section, we will investigate the views of Karl Popper. 
The ‘middle position’
Karl Popper: Changes through conjectures and 
refutations
For Popper, changes in scientific frameworks cannot be 
sufficiently explained by the psychological propensity of 
the individual scientist (Popper 1961:154). Because science 
is practiced socially (rather than individually) the result 
can be a free competition of ideas which will eventually 
lead to progressive scientific change (Popper 1961:154–155). 
Of course, this proliferation of many different hypotheses 
necessitates rigorous methods of testing and falsification.
By ‘conjectures and refutations’ scientists can learn from 
their mistakes through mutual criticism (Popper 1963:vii; 
cf. 1979:260–261). Refuted theories become stepping stones 
towards improved knowledge and by repeated refutations 
the most corroborated scientific theories gradually approach 
the truth (Popper 1963:245). This means that, for Popper, 
changes in scientific frameworks occur in a way that is 
rather gradual, in the sense of a continuous reform of weaker 
theories. It is important to note that this ‘linear’ growth does 
not occur automatically (driven by some internal force in the 
development of science) but is rather the result of a laborious 
process of falsification (Popper 1963:365). Furthermore, 
the surviving theories should not be considered as having 
reached any kind of ultimate truth, because the ‘elimination 
of a finite number of such explanations cannot reduce the 
infinity of the surviving possible explanations’ (Popper 
1979:264–265). Perhaps it is only natural for Popper (1996:1) 
to describe scientific changes from an ‘evolutionary’ 
perspective, through a kind of analogy of natural selection.
For Popper (1996) three levels of adaptation have something 
fundamental in common:
1. genetic adaptation
2. adaptive behavioural learning
3. scientific discovery (pp. 2–3).
On all three levels, progress starts from an ‘inherited structure’ 
and on the scientific level this corresponds to the dominant 
scientific conjectures and theories (Popper 1996:3). On all 
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levels, the structure is transmitted through instruction and, 
on the scientific level specifically, by social tradition and 
imitation (Popper 1996:3). On all three levels the instruction 
comes from within the structure and changes on the scientific 
level will become new instructions that continue to arise from 
within (Popper 1996:3). When the instructions are exposed to 
‘environmental pressures’, for instance theoretical problems, 
they are changed by processes which are partly random 
and, on the scientific level, become new and revolutionary 
tentative theories (Popper 1996:3). For Popper, scientific 
change is thus partly originating from within (and therefore 
partly constrained) and at least partly random.
Furthermore, the next stage of scientific change involves 
a process of ‘selection’ or a stage of elimination of error 
(Popper 1996:3). For Popper (1996:3) this natural selection is 
a kind of negative feedback on all three levels. This selection 
process will never reach an equilibrium state, as no perfect 
or optimal trial solution is likely to be found and because 
new instructions that emerge will, in turn, effect change in 
the environment (Popper 1996:4). On the scientific level, 
such environmental changes occur, for example, when 
new conjectures open up new and unexpected problems 
(Popper 1996:4).
The scientific level, however, differs from both the 
genetic and behavioural levels, by being more creative 
and revolutionary (Popper 1996:6). Scientific theories are 
formulated linguistically and duly become ‘objects outside 
of ourselves’ which can subsequently be subjected to 
criticism (Popper 1996:6–7). The linguistic nature of theories 
imbues scientific discovery with the creative imagination 
of ‘explanatory story-telling, myth making and poetic 
imagination’ (Popper 1996:7). What this means for changes 
in scientific frameworks, is that changes are the result of 
both conservative, traditional or historical elements, as well 
as more revolutionary or critical elements. Scientific change, 
although somewhat evolutionary, also displays a linear 
pattern. In the end, it is ‘pattern’ which gets the priority: 
in fact, refuted theories become ‘stepping stones’ towards 
‘better’ theories, in continuity with the evolutionary line 
(Popper 1963:243−245). In the next section, another example 
of an author adopting a ‘middle position’ is investigated.
Can framework changes perhaps be predicted? 
Imre Lakatos
According to Lakatos, great scientific achievements should 
not be considered as isolated theories, but rather as ‘research 
programmes’, to be evaluated in terms of ‘progressive’ or 
‘degenerating’ problemshifts2 (Lakatos 1978:110). Scientific 
change occurs when research programmes supersede 
each other, that is, one research programme overtakes 
another in terms of progress (Lakatos 1978:110). Because it 
is conventionally acceptable to retain ‘spatio-temporally 
2.For Lakatos (1978:112) a research programme is progressive when its theoretical 
growth anticipates its empirical growth, that is, when novel facts are successfully 
predicted (‘progressive problemshift’). Degenerating problemshifts occur when the 
theoretical growth of the research programme cannot keep up with its empirical 
growth and it only gives post hoc explanations of chance discoveries or discoveries 
anticipated and made by rival programmes. In this case, the research programme 
is said to be ‘stagnating’.
singular factual statements’, as well as ‘spatio-temporally 
universal theories’, some continuity is present within 
scientific change (Lakatos 1978:110). Such continuity evolves 
from research programmes, which consists of methodological 
rules instructing scientists on what research paths to take 
up (‘positive heuristic’) or to avoid (‘negative heuristic’) 
(Lakatos 1970:132). 
Lakatos’s research programmes are further characterised by 
their ‘hard core’ which is considered by provisional decision 
to be irrefutable and which defines problems, foresees 
anomalies and turns them victoriously into examples, all 
according to plan (1978:110–111). The hard core of the 
research programme further outlines the construction of a 
belt of auxiliary hypotheses which forms the ‘protective belt’ 
of the research programme (Lakatos 1978:110). According to 
Lakatos (1970:133) it is the protective belt which gets tested, 
re-adjusted and even replaced in order to defend the thus 
hardened core.
It is interesting to note that, for Lakatos (1970:132), both 
the positive and negative heuristic indicate (implicitly) the 
conceptual framework and language of scientific research 
programmes. This may mean that, in Lakatos’s epistemic 
model, continuity is not linked to the structural order for 
reality3, but rather seated in the knowing (human) subject. 
Scientific change, however, is not simply arbitrary but 
follows somewhat predictable ‘methodological rules’. In this 
sense one may say that even in Lakatos’s moderate position 
‘pattern’ retains some priority over randomness.
The authors mentioned in the following sections, however, 
detect more ‘freedom’ in framework changes.
Unconstrained change
Thomas Kuhn: changes in normal and 
revolutionary science
In The structure of scientific revolutions (1970a) Thomas Kuhn 
describes scientific change in terms of two distinct phases 
of science, namely normal and revolutionary science. In the 
case of normal science, scientists are not aiming explicitly at 
innovation and therefore change is very limited. The changes 
are determined by a community of scientists working 
under the same epistemic framework. According to Kuhn 
(1970a:168), the members of the group have shared training 
and experience and, as such, are the ‘sole possessors of the 
rules of the game or of some equivalent basis for unequivocal 
judgments’. This means that the scientific community will 
decide which changes are acceptable under their shared 
paradigm. Their judgment will be in favour of changes 
that are aligned with the accepted theories. For Kuhn 
(1970b:246; 1970c:4–5) the aim of normal science amounts 
to ‘puzzle-solving’. During normal scientific practice the 
3.In using the phrase ‘structural order for reality’, I follow the distinction made by 
Hart (1984:38, 85). According to Hart the order for reality refers to ‘the order of 
conditions to which the empirical world conforms’. This can be contrasted with 
the order of reality, referring to the ‘experienced world of subjective existence’. 
As such, the structural order for reality conditions scientific thought, since science 
investigates a ‘system of universality’ holding for the world of individual existence 
(Hart 1984:38; cf. Coletto 2007:7).
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premises of the ruling paradigm will define the puzzles to be 
solved, guarantee that the puzzles are indeed solvable and 
determine when a suitable solution is reached. This means 
that the changes in normal science will be ‘cumulative’ in the 
sense that they are merely further elaborations of accepted 
theories, as new puzzles will be solved with ‘conceptual and 
instrumental techniques close to those already in existence’ 
(Kuhn 1970a:96).
As in the normal phase of science the changes continue to 
share the premises of the paradigm and add to the collective 
achievements of the scientific community, they are viewed 
(by the particular scientific community) as constituting 
progress (Kuhn 1970a:162–163). However, Kuhn (1970a:163), 
in quoting Max Planck, states that in the end progress in 
normal science is ‘simply in the eye of the beholder’. It is 
important to note, of course, that this ‘beholder’ is not simply 
an individual scientist, but rather a community of scientists 
reaching consensus. 
According to Kuhn (1970b:247), normal science progresses 
because the community of scientists can take an accepted 
theory for granted (rather than criticise it) and can explore it 
to almost ‘esoteric depth and detail otherwise unimaginable’. 
Because this in-depth exploration is bound to uncover 
anomalies, normal science will ultimately take a critical turn 
into what Kuhn terms ‘revolutionary science’. A brief look at 
this fundamental phase of Kuhnian science is necessary.
In revolutionary science, changes occur in terms of replacing 
one paradigm with another, after ‘nature itself’ has 
undermined the professional security and has problematised 
the prior achievements of the scientific community (Kuhn 
1970a:169). The alternative (i.e. new) paradigm will only be 
embraced by the community if it has the potential to resolve 
generally recognised problems and if it preserves a large part 
of the concrete puzzle-solving ability of the old paradigm 
(Kuhn 1970a:169).
Despite its improved puzzle-solving ability, the new paradigm 
is not a better representation of what nature is really like 
(Kuhn 1970a:206). Contrary to Popper, this means that 
successive paradigms do not increasingly approach the truth 
(Kuhn 1970a:170).4 This lack of an ultimate goal in scientific 
revolutions, has led Kuhn to dwindle between revolution 
and evolution, in his choice of terms, to describe the nature 
of paradigm changes. According to Kuhn (1970a):
The net result of a sequence of such [revolutionary selections], 
separated by periods of normal research, is the wonderfully 
[adapted] set of instruments we call modern scientific knowledge. 
Successive stages in that developmental process are marked by 
an increase in articulation and [specialisation]. And the entire 
process may have occurred, as we now suppose biological 
[evolution] did, without benefit of a set goal, a permanent fixed 
scientific truth, of which each stage in the [development] of 
scientific knowledge is a better exemplar. (pp. 172–173)
4.For Kuhn, ‘truth’ in this case refers to the ontological match between the postulated 
entities and that which is really out there and since there is no theory-independent 
way to understand what is out there, the idea of truth as such (for Kuhn) becomes 
‘illusive in principle’ (Kuhn 1970a:206).
Furthermore, because paradigm changes do not imply 
directed ontological development, scientific revolutions are 
‘non-cumulative’ (Kuhn 1970a:92). These characteristics of 
paradigm changes could easily be interpreted in a manner 
that would make change rather unconstrained.
Evaluation of Kuhn’s views
According to Lakatos (1970:178–180; cf. 140 fn. 3), the Kuhnian 
view of scientific change implies that there are very few logical 
reasons for revolutions, but many psychological ones. When 
a Kuhnian paradigm comes into ‘crisis’, this denotes (for 
Lakatos 1970:178) a psychological state of ‘contagious panic’. 
Furthermore, the new paradigm will be incommensurable 
with the previous one (each containing its own standards) 
and there will be no supra-paradigmatic rational standards 
with which to compare them (Lakatos 1970:178). 
Kuhn’s insistence on the role of the scientific community 
in paradigm-choice, has further led Lakatos to describe 
Kuhnian paradigm change as causing a ‘bandwagon effect’ 
which will eventually become a ‘mob rule’ as individual 
scientists imitate the great scientists by submission to the 
collective wisdom of the community (Lakatos 1970:178–179). 
I agree with Lakatos’s interpretation: Kuhnian revolutions 
may eventually be the result of propaganda or rhetorical 
persuasion.5 
For Kuhn (1970a:94) the circular argument (presupposing a 
paradigm whilst arguing for its defence) is indeed an effective 
form of persuasion in a scientific community, leading to a 
form of assent that is rhetorical (and therefore not logically 
or even probabilistically given).
To summarise, Kuhn clearly has two different sides to his 
conceptions of change in scientific frameworks: considering 
revolutionary science, paradigm changes are rather 
unconstrained. But we also have periods of normal science, 
during which changes in frameworks are ‘linear’, ‘additive’ or 
‘cumulative’ (Kuhn 1970a:52–53; 96; cf. 1970b:250). Therefore, 
Kuhn may be seen as holding a rather moderate position 
amongst authors who consider changes to be rather free 
and unconstrained. Although Kuhn regards it as incorrect to 
describe his position as a form of relativism, he leaves the 
door open for partial relativism.6 One of the most prominent 
figures to step through this open door was Paul Feyerabend.
Paul Feyerabend and methodological anarchy
For Feyerabend, the dynamics of scientific change are the 
result of the interplay of two principles, namely ‘proliferation 
and tenacity’ (Feyerabend 1970:210). Scientists must be 
allowed to ‘introduce new ideas even when popular views 
5.In partial defence of Kuhn, it should be noted that he does not simply propose that 
might makes right in the sciences, and that scientists are the victims of a history 
rewritten by the powers that be, since the special nature of scientific communities 
qualifies them for arbitration of professional matters (Kuhn 1970a:167).
6.Kuhn (1970b:264–266) states: ‘In one sense of the term I may be a relativist, in a 
more essential one I am not.’ In the first sense Kuhn refers to his view of scientific 
development as being fundamentally evolving, unidirectional and irreversible, 
which results in some scientific theories being considered better than others. In the 
second sense, Kuhn refers to his view that truth is a term with only intra-theoretic 
applications, which results in certain scientific theories being no better than others 
in representing what is really ‘out there’ in nature. 
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should appear to be fully justified and without blemish’ and 
at the same time have the right to ‘retain ideas in the face 
of difficulties’ (Feyerabend 1970:210). Noteworthy are the 
undertows of subjectivism and relativism7 in Feyerabend’s 
understanding of the principles.
 
With regards to ‘proliferation’, Feyerabend (1970:210) seems 
to support relativism by stating that people should be able 
to follow their inclinations and that ‘there is no need to 
suppress even the most outlandish product of the human 
brain’. With his view of ‘tenacity’, Feyerabend subscribes 
to a form of subjectivism, where ‘one is encouraged not just 
to follow one’s inclinations, but to develop them further’ 
and to employ criticism (in the form of comparison with 
existing alternatives) in order to strengthen one’s own views 
(Feyerabend 1970:210). According to Feyerabend (1970:210), 
however, both proliferation and tenacity support the 
ultimate aim of science: ‘…happiness and the full development 
of an individual human being is now as ever the highest possible 
value’ [italics inserted by author]
To reach this highest possible aim, Feyerabend 
(1975:29–32) advises us to proceed in a counter-inductive 
manner. Without ‘chaos’, no knowledge and no progressive 
change will be possible (Feyerabend 1975:179). The reason 
for this approach is that any fixed method rests on a too 
limited view of the complexity of the human condition 
(Feyerabend 1975:27). The freedom of the individual is 
elevated to a point where it is to be fully unconstrained. The 
scientist is therefore free (like the sophists of antiquity) to 
defend different ideas in different circumstances, to hold no 
idea and all ideas at the same time. According to Feyerabend 
(1975:189), the scientist may change his views ‘as a result of 
argument, or of boredom, or of a conversion experience, or to 
impress a mistress, and so on’. In the end, the only principle 
for epistemic change that Feyerabend (1975:28) is willing to 
defend, is ‘anything goes’. 
For Feyerabend, changes in scientific frameworks are 
therefore not guided by well-defined programmes (because 
the anarchistic method contains the conditions for the 
realisation of all possible programmes), but change is rather 
guided by ‘vague urges’ or ‘passion’ (Feyerabend 1975:26). 
In the wake of Feyerabend (though in a more moderate spirit) 
more authors seem to agree that changes in frameworks 
occur in a manner that is rather free and random.
Change after Feyerabend
Although it is certainly not the only trend after Feyerabend, 
some authors do continue in the vein of unpredictability 
of change (though in a more moderate spirit). For Lyotard 
science, as a kind of ‘language game’, cannot yield certain 
knowledge (Lyotard 1984:38–39). In this language game, 
scientific knowledge is constantly reduplicated, that is, ‘citing 
7.Subjectivism and relativism are not always equated to each other (as in Bernstein 
1985). According to Van der Walt (2008:66−67) the tendency to emphasise the 
human subject (subjectivism) as well as the cultural situation and historical change, 
in terms of worldviews, can lead to the more radical view of ‘so many views so many 
worlds’ (relativism). Relativism can thus be regarded as a possible consequence of 
subjectivism.
its own statements in a second-level discourse (autonymy) 
that functions to legitimate them’8 (Lyotard 1984:38). 
According to Lyotard (1984), the need for legitimation itself 
causes a process of delegitimation:
There is an erosion at work inside the speculative game [of 
science], and by loosening the weave of the encyclopedic net in 
which each science has to find its place, it eventually sets them 
free. (p. 39)
This ‘internal erosion of the legitimacy principle of 
knowledge’ has the result of creating a ‘constant flux’ of areas 
of enquiry (Lyotard 1984:39). This causes a crisis in scientific 
knowledge. Apart from not being able to legitimise itself, 
the game of science has no special authority over any other 
game, because (although each kind of game has its own set of 
rules) all games are on par with the others (Lyotard 1984:40). 
In the end, for Lyotard (1984:41) only ‘language practice’ and 
‘communicational interaction’ provide some legitimation. 
Postmodern science focuses on ‘undecidables’, on the limits 
of precise control, on catastrophes, paradoxes and other 
related subjects , and this causes evolution in science to be 
‘non-rectifiable’ and ‘paradoxical’ (Lyotard 1984:60).
Richard Rorty seems to agree that truth is ‘a property of 
linguistic entities’ and that these languages are made by us, 
rather than found in the world (Rorty 1990:7). This means 
that the world cannot tell us what language game to play 
(Rorty 1990:7). However, Rorty does not simply substitute 
objective criteria for the choice of language game with 
subjective criteria (Rorty 1990:7). For Rorty, changes in 
language games are not the result of conscious decisions, 
but rather the result of the loss or acquisition of ‘habits’ in 
using certain words. It would seem as if, in Rorty’s model, 
changes in scientific frameworks are the result of customs of 
vocabulary. 
Further examples of authors who emphasise freedom of 
change in a postmodern climate could be included (e.g. 
Bloor, Barnes, Collins and other ‘social constructivists’), 
but I will have to stop here. This brings us to the end of this 
historical overview and in the next section I will propose a 
transcendental criticism of the polarisation described in the 
previous sections.
At the roots of constrained and 
random change
A reformational hypothesis
We have seen that several authors regard changes in pre-
scientific and scientific frameworks as being either free and 
random or quite constrained. In some cases, a synthesis of 
the two views is attempted. In most cases, however, the 
integration of constancy and change does not seem to emerge 
either clearly or sufficiently. This is obviously the case with 
8.The problem of ‘legitimation’ is borrowed from Habermas (e.g. 1976) and remains 
prominent in recent philosophy (cf. Coletto 2007), for example in Lyotard. The 
quest for legitimation can be regarded as an attempt at identifying an authoritative 
foundation for politics, ethics or (in casu) science (the three spheres distinguished 
by Kant and accepted by Habermas). Lyotard rejects legitimation by meta-narrative 
(e.g. Habermas’s ‘emancipation’) and argues that petit recits (small narratives) are 
all one can rely on. 
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the two opposite models, because either change or constancy 
is given primacy. But even in the ‘middle positions’, change 
and constancy are juxtaposed or balanced, rather than 
integrated.
Should one attempt to penetrate into the deeper reasons 
behind this state of affairs? The following hypothesis can 
be advanced from a Dooyeweerdian point of view. Herman 
Dooyeweerd does not discuss the authors mentioned in this 
article, but he (1979:148–188) describes the consequences 
of certain pre-theoretical dynamics and mechanisms for 
culture in general. He (1979:15–16) recognises a religious 
driving force at work in humanist culture, which he terms 
the ‘nature-freedom’ ground motive. The nature-pole is 
rooted in the orderliness of concrete reality (conceived 
rather deterministically) whilst the freedom-pole is rooted 
in the unconstrained human personality. In Roots of western 
culture, Dooyeweerd (1979) describes the modern humanist 
emphasis on the freedom of the human personality and the 
view of ‘nature’ consequently adopted. Nature becomes:
an expansive arena for the explorations of his (sic) free personality, 
as a field of infinite possibilities in which the sovereignty of 
human personality must be revealed by a complete mastery of 
the phenomena of nature. (p. 50)
By contrast, the ‘nature’ pole of the ground motive (which 
prevailed until the 18th century) implied a mechanistic 
view of nature and the adoption of the natural-scientific 
method (with its faith in the power of reason and progress). 
This ideal of science tried to include all of reality in a chain 
of causes and effects inspired by physics and leading to 
the division of complex phenomena into their simplest 
‘elements’ (Dooyeweerd 1979:183). This became the new 
scientific method, granting the elimination of prejudice and 
speculation. In this perspective, nothing can be accepted as 
‘truly real if it does not fit into this chain of mechanical cause 
and effect’ (Dooyeweerd 1979:153). Ironically, however, it 
soon became apparent that this ‘chain’ left no freedom for the 
human being itself (regarded as a part of nature and therefore 
also causally determined). Nature and freedom, therefore, 
threaten each other: either humans ‘abolish’ nature, or 
nature abolishes humans. In between these extremes, there 
are recurring attempts at ‘reconciling’ the two poles in a sort 
of middle position.
 
In the 19th century the shift to the freedom-pole inspired a 
new scientific method inclined to a ‘new universalism’, which 
led to an attempt at understanding the ‘peculiar place and 
function of the parts in terms of the whole’ and focused on 
the individuality of phenomena (Dooyeweerd 1979:182–183). 
This was particularly suited to the science of history and, 
thus, historicism was enthroned as the new scientific method 
(Dooyeweerd 1979:184). Dooyeweerd closely associates 
historicism and relativism. In his (1979:151) opinion the 
historicism of the freedom pole did not permit scientific 
thought to recognise a given structural (i.e. creational) 
order9, thus causing the locus of order to be (mis)placed in 
the human knowing subject. One of the consequences was 
9.With ‘given creation order’, Dooyeweerd refers to the structure for reality (cf. fn 1 
above).
that the notion of scientific truth became rather relativised.10 
Summing up, the two poles of the humanist ground 
motive move in two different directions. The one leads 
to a constrained, patterned, even determined world, the 
other leads towards a world of unconstrained freedom 
and unpredictable developments. As science and its 
developments are part of this world, they are (intuitively) 
regarded as constrained or un-constrained, depending on the 
pole attracting the scholar’s trust.
The humanist ground motive and framework 
changes
From this point of view, the authors examined above can 
all be placed on a continuum between the two extremes of 
the nature-freedom ground motive. It should be noted that, 
historically speaking, we meet, firstly, the authors relying 
on ‘determined’ change, secondly, the middle position and, 
thirdly, the option of unconstrained change emerges. Authors 
such as Holton may be considered closer to the nature-
pole, whilst Popper and Lakatos occupy positions that can 
be considered fairly centralised between the two extremes. 
Feyerabend, Lyotard and Rorty tend towards the freedom 
pole. Kuhn also belongs to the latter group, but seems to be 
more moderate in his position. What all of these authors have 
in common, however, is that their positions all depend on a 
dialectical (pre-theoretical) starting point.
In the case of dialectical ground motives, two ‘spiritually 
charged’ poles exist within a single ground motive 
(Dooyeweerd 1979:12). The resulting dialectic is characterised 
by an absolutisation of part of created reality, which 
necessarily calls forth the correlates of what has been 
absolutised (Dooyeweerd 1979:13). Dooyeweerd explains 
that an absolutisation of something which is relative will, 
in the long run, lead to an absolutisation of its ‘opposite’ or 
‘counterpart’, because all parts of creation are necessarily 
related to each other. Such a religious dialectic can never 
be synthesised into a higher union, because no higher point 
than the absolute exists.
This dialectic generates a kind of ‘pendulum dynamic’ driving 
theoretical thinking from one pole to the other in its attempt 
to rid itself of this correlativity. According to Dooyeweerd 
(1979:13) the effect of the pendulum dynamic is that priority 
or primacy is alternatively attributed to one of the two poles, 
whilst simultaneously depreciating its opposite. Attempts at 
synthesis are also performed and can be observed in authors 
who attempt to hold a middle position between the two 
extremes. As a result of the powerful dialectical dynamics 
at work, however, such attempts are usually short-lived, 
genuine integration cannot be achieved and the pendulum 
quickly moves to the next pole.
What has been presented here is a hypothesis aimed at 
understanding and penetrating to the roots of the three 
main positions concerning framework change, presented 
10.As Strauss (2005:225) points out, historicism taken to the extreme (‘everything 
is history’) becomes unthinkable (‘there is nothing left which can have a 
history’). More radical consequences of this cultural movement include nihilistic 
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in the previous sections. Some readers might consider that 
such a hypothesis would require substantiation by further 
evidence, taking into account the complex developments 
of each author’s philosophy. All this cannot be offered 
within a single article: here I can only indicate, as a modest 
contribution, a direction for further research. This hypothesis, 
however, is not indispensable or even necessary11 to proceed 
to our next step, namely the search for a model in which 
change and constancy are better integrated. The main reason 
for this search is that the models already explored may not be 
regarded as fully satisfactory. In fact, change and constancy 
could not be properly integrated, even though in some cases 
they appear as somehow ‘balanced’.
As an alternative to this polarisation, it may be worthwhile 
to consider authors who proceed from a non-dialectical 
starting point. A model may be regarded as non-dialectical 
when it is rooted in a ground motive which does not present 
dialectical traits (cf. Dooyeweerd 1979:11–14). According 
to Dooyeweerd, the Christian biblical ground motive of 
creation, fall and redemption should be regarded as non-
dialectical. This is the basis on which Dooyeweerd’s work 
developed, and on which Marinus Stafleu (1987:153–157) has 
developed a model to account for the scientific enterprise.12 
In the next section, it will be necessary to briefly explain 
Stafleu’s view of science in general, before moving to the 
more specific question concerning the nature of change in 
scientific frameworks.
Marinus Stafleu
A multidimensional model for framework 
changes
In Stafleu’s model the notion of law  is prominent. The aim of 
the scientific enterprise is defined as: ‘the opening up of the 
law-side of nature’; and the ‘discovery and development of 
law-conformity in reality’ (Stafleu 1987:152). Furthermore, his 
definition of objectivity reads as follows: ‘not conformity of 
theory to fact, but law-conformity’ (Stafleu 1987:241). This has 
a normative consequence: ‘investigation of the lawfulness of 
the creation is conducted by respect for the laws, or rather for 
the law-giver, the Sovereign of heaven and earth’ and further 
‘it means the subordination of human thought to divine law’ 
(Stafleu 1987:241). The laws are not merely ‘descriptive’, 
but also ‘prescriptive’ (Stafleu 1987:153). This is an attempt 
at escaping the subject-object dilemma described above by 
introducing a dimension (the law, and the structural order) 
which was often recommended by Van Riessen (1992:54–55) 
as the most suitable ‘anchorage’ for scientific research.
Stafleu’s (1987) model outlines three basic dimensions (or 
coordinates) which show that research is not a linear process, 
but is multidimensional:
11.The Dooyeweerdian hypothesis is also not the only one that could be employed for 
the aim of exploring the dialectical conflict discussed above. Similar conclusions 
might be reached by referring for example to Bernstein’s (1985) conflict (‘agon’) 
between objectivism and relativism or by utilising Visagie’s (1996) ‘macromotives’ 
and the type of ‘emotive logic’ that they generate.
12.A detailed discussion of the connections between the Christian-biblical ground 
motive and the concrete proposals and tenets of reformational philosophy would 
be too complex to be (re)proposed here. For an introduction to this topic see for 
example Hart (1984:325−370).
1. the distinction between the ‘law-side’ and the ‘subject-
side’ (all of which is subjected to the law)13 of nature
2. the distinction between ‘universal’ and ‘typical’ modes of 
being or experience
3. the distinction between the various (irreducible) aspects 
of human experience14 (pp. 153–154).
Regarding the scientific inquiry, each of the three dimensions 
is connected with two pairs of directions of research (Stafleu 
1987:154):
1. We can note that induction is directed toward the law-side 
whilst deduction is directed towards the subject-side. 
2. The search for unity is directed to the universal, whilst the 
search for structure is directed to the typical.  
3. Lastly, with regards to the search for applications is 
determined by anticipations, whilst the search for 
objectivity is determined by retrocipations (pp. 154–
156). 
According to Stafleu (1979:15ff) this manifests as a certain 
pattern in the history of science: a field of science becomes 
‘isolated’ from other fields and subsequently it becomes 
possible to ‘develop’ the field, for example to ‘design a 
mathematical framework’, to ‘relate’ it to other fields or to 
‘apply’ it to technical problems.
Stafleu (1979) recognises that this process occurs in various 
phases:
1. An orientation stage characterised by more or less 
uncoordinated observations and speculative explanations 
(roughly corresponding to Kuhn’s pre-paradigm phase).
2. A period of ‘isolation’, during which the specific 
concepts and problems of the field are distinguished 
from those of other fields. Although there is no generally 
accepted theory (as Kuhn would argue) authoritative 
scientific works appear, summarising the properties and 
phenomena characterising a certain field.15 (This phase 
roughly corresponds to what Kuhn would regard as the 
acquisition of the first paradigm).
3. Furthermore, what Kuhn would call paradigm-shifts are 
explained by Stafleu as the discovery of both retrocipatory 
and anticipatory analogies. This happened for example 
during the phase of ‘mathematization’ of physics, when 
the numerical modal aspect shed light on physical 
phenomena. (p. 15ff)
The model can therefore be used to explain what happens when 
changes occur in scientific frameworks. In what follows, the 
term ‘multi-dimensional’, which I proposed, is enriched by the 
connotation of ‘multi-modal’.
13.Stafleu regards as subjected to the law both the (knowing human) subject and the 
object of knowledge. Simply stated, ‘all things, events and relations are subjected 
to laws’ (Stafleu 1987:153).
14.For a list of the ‘aspects’ of human experience, cf. fn. 1 above. According to Stafleu 
(1987:154), the aspects are related to each other because: (1) ‘they show a linear 
order’ which can be indicated as referring forward (anticipations) or backward 
(retrocipations) and (2) each aspect refers to the other aspects.
15.Stafleu (1979:15ff) demonstrates this pattern in the history of science, in dialogue 
with Kuhn, by using examples from studies of electricity and magnetism: William 
Gilbert gave a summary of magnetism in 1600, separating the two fields from each 




Page 9 of 10
Constancy and change in framework changes  
Stafleu argues that during the opening-up process meaning is 
both deepened and relativised (Stafleu 1980:26) (In the latter 
case, especially, the discoveries can be truly spectacular). This 
means that framework changes are not only ‘revolutionary’, 
but also follow persistent ‘themes’ (to use Holton’s 
language). In fact, the modal aspect in question remains the 
same (as a fundamental and irreducible mode of explanation), 
but at the same time it is not exactly the same anymore, 
as it is ‘opened up’ by modal analogies (Stafleu 1980:26). 
Change and constancy are therefore deeply integrated. From 
this point of view, the fact that both revolutionary change 
and persistent ‘themes’ were discovered in the history of 
science becomes quite understandable (Stafleu 1980:27).
This model also implies that changes in epistemic frameworks 
occur according to a pattern, neither completely random nor 
rigidly constrained, which results in change being dynamic 
but not arbitrary. Because the model is based on a non-
dialectical motive, change and constancy are more integrated 
and coherent, in a way that is not always possible even in the 
most ‘centralized’ positions examined above. For example, 
Kuhn has change especially in one (the revolutionary) 
phase of science and constancy in another (normal science). 
Popper and Lakatos may be regarded as having a more 
integrated approach and this may be appreciated. However, 
if the (reformational) hypothesis that they are attempting 
an unlikely synthesis is plausible, one would expect that 
their attempt would be rapidly followed by more polarised 
positions (in this case in the historicist direction). Historically 
speaking, this is precisely what happened.
Stafleu’s model deals particularly with changes in 
special-scientific frameworks. Regarding the pre-theoretical 
frameworks, other authors in the reformational tradition 
have developed some valuable perspectives. As already 
mentioned, Dooyeweerd (1979:11–14) describes a ‘pendulum’ 
dynamic between opposing poles of a religious ground 
motive, giving some structure to changes, whilst with 
philosophy the problem-historical method of Vollenhoven 
(2005:113; 114) suggests some interaction between ‘types’ 
and ‘time currents’ in such a way that ‘types’ are changed 
by each new time period. An explication of the latter method 
is beyond the scope of the current article, but is well worth 
investigating (cf. Vollenhoven 2005:95ff). 
Conclusion 
Since the recognition of the existence and role of pre-
scientific epistemic frameworks in philosophy of science, 
three main approaches to framework change  have been 
detected. The first approach regards changes in frameworks 
as occurring in a way that is rather constrained, predictable 
and even according to a pre-determined pattern. The second 
approach seems to argue that changes in frameworks occur 
in a way that is more random or unpredictable and free from 
constraints. In between these two views, a middle position is 
found that attempts a kind of synthesis between constancy 
and change.
 
The reformational approach sketched above would 
acknowledge the importance of the structural order for 
reality (in terms of the modal aspects) influencing changes in 
epistemic frameworks. By referring to both the irreducibility 
and cohesion of modal aspects, I have argued, it is possible to 
explain framework changes both in terms of continuity and 
revolutions, which result in changes being dynamic but also 
deeply integrated with constancy. 
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